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REPORT
 DOES UNIVERSAL 
CREDIT ENABLE 
HOUSEHOLDS TO 
REACH A MINIMUM 
INCOME STANDARD?
Donald Hirsch and Yvette Hartfree 
This report looks at the impact Universal Credit (UC) 
will have on the disposable incomes of families with 
low or no earnings. It examines whether they have 
enough to reach a minimum acceptable standard 
of living, as measured by the Minimum Income 
Standard (MIS) for the United Kingdom.
The report helps to show how successful UC will be in achieving the key 
objective of improving work incentives. It also explores how far the credit will 
enable households to work in order to obtain a socially acceptable standard 
of living rather than simply to escape dire poverty.
This report shows:
• how much families on various wages and working hours will be left with 
after paying taxes, rent and childcare costs and receiving UC; 
• what potential they have to increase this amount by working more hours;
• how these amounts compare to a minimum benchmark, MIS; 
• how this situation compares to the old system in 2013; and
• the impact of other changes in state support, past, present and planned 
for the future.
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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
From 2013 onwards, the Universal Credit (UC) 
system is simplifying support for low-income 
families by providing a single payment to those 
both in and out of work, and is intended to help 
‘make work pay’. This report looks at the extent 
to which UC helps people achieve a minimum 
acceptable standard of living, as measured by the 
Minimum Income Standard (MIS), and at how well it 
incentivises families to raise their earnings in order 
to achieve an adequate income. 
Incentives and adequacy under UC will vary considerably by family type. 
Those without children fall furthest below a minimum income if they do 
not work, but also find it easiest to get above this standard by working, 
particularly if they live as couples. Lone parents get considerable state 
support if on low or no earnings, but this disappears rapidly once they 
work more than about ten hours a week, creating an income ‘plateau’ 
at below the minimum required for an acceptable standard of living 
as measured by MIS – unless they have above-average wages. Similar 
conditions apply to a second earner in a low-wage couple with children. 
However, since the income plateau is strongly affected by childcare, families 
with older children and families who get free childcare experience much less 
severe disincentive effects, and can potentially achieve an adequate income 
by working full time on a modest wage.
The switch from the benefit and tax credit system to UC produces 
winners and losers, with the most significant winners being part-time 
workers who work too few hours to be able to claim the current tax credits 
(including support for childcare), but who will be eligible under UC. However, 
in order to reach MIS, families usually have to work more than this, and for 
full-time workers the switch to UC makes relatively little or no difference. 
What has made a difference is recent cuts in entitlements, which will carry 
over to UC. In the case of a lone parent who has one child and is working 
full time on a low wage, these have doubled the shortfall compared with MIS. 
Such cuts continue under the present policy for uprating benefits, but under 
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provisional plans to improve childcare support in 2016, such a family would 
become significantly better off. 
These findings show that UC combines with other changes to impact on 
both work incentives and income adequacy. The biggest risk is that it will trap 
families on incomes below what they need and make it difficult or impossible 
for them to progress further.
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 1 INTRODUCTION
In 2013, the Government is starting its overhaul 
of the benefi t and tax credit system, introducing 
Universal Credit (UC) as the principal means of 
fi nancial support for people of working age who 
are either on a low income or out of work. The 
new system is intended to ‘make work pay’ and to 
support individuals and families on limited means 
through a single, integrated payment that is easy 
to understand. 
UC is a monthly sum, based on family composition plus allowances for rent 
and any eligible childcare costs, paid in full to those who are not working, and 
to those earning less than a set level, and reduced by 65p in the pound for 
post-tax income above that level. 
This report looks at the extent to which the new system is able to give 
low-income families a ‘hand up’, enabling them to reach acceptable living 
standards through work. This is partly an issue of how it structures work 
incentives, in terms of how it withdraws help as people become better off. 
Any means-tested system of this type faces the challenge of ensuring 
that support is not withdrawn too quickly as people become better off 
(undermining work incentives), yet not withdrawn so slowly that it becomes 
expensive and makes too many people dependent on state support. 
However, support for people on low income is not just an issue of 
incentives but also of the adequacy of their income including that support. 
If a benefit system increased work incentives by reducing out-of-work 
entitlements, this could increase poverty levels; any government is bound 
to consider whether the level of income paid to people not working 
provides an acceptable safety net. A further ‘adequacy’ issue arises in the 
decision about how much people should be allowed to earn before UC 
starts being reduced. The simultaneous reduction of UC and the imposition 
of income tax creates an income ‘plateau’, a band of earnings over which 
disposable income varies relatively little with earnings. Incentive issues 
relate to the flatness of this plateau; but adequacy issues relate to its level. 
If the income plateau is too low for an acceptable standard of living, the 
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message that UC helps low-income families to a better life will have a 
hollow ring. 
The Minimum Income Standard (MIS) for the United Kingdom provides a 
benchmark against which the adequacy of disposable household income can 
be assessed. It is calculated following careful research with members of the 
public, looking at what households need to be able to afford, as a minimum, 
and specifies the disposable income required for a socially acceptable 
standard of living (Box 1). 
Box 1: The Minimum Income Standard (MIS)
MIS is the income that people need in order to reach a minimum socially 
acceptable standard of living in the United Kingdom today, based on 
what members of the public think. It is calculated by specifying baskets 
of goods and services required by different types of household in order 
to meet these needs and to participate in society. 
The research is funded by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation and 
carried out by the Centre for Research in Social Policy (CRSP) at 
Loughborough University, producing annual updates from 2008 
onwards. MIS was originally developed in partnership with the Family 
Budget Unit at the University of York, bringing together expert-based 
and ‘consensual’ (based on what the public think) methods. The research 
entails a sequence of detailed deliberations by groups of members of 
the public, informed by expert knowledge where needed. The groups 
work to the following definition: 
“A minimum standard of living in the United Kingdom 
today includes, but is more than just, food, clothes and 
shelter. It is about having what you need in order to have 
the opportunities and choices necessary to participate in 
society.”
MIS distinguishes between the needs of different family types. It applies 
to ‘nuclear’ families and to childless adults; that is, to households that 
comprise a single adult or a couple, with or without dependent children. 
MIS is relevant to the discussion of poverty, but does not claim to be 
a poverty threshold. This is because participants in the research were 
not specifically asked to talk about what defines poverty. However, it is 
relevant to the poverty debate in that almost all households officially 
defined as being in income poverty (having below 60 per cent of median 
income) are also below MIS. Thus households classified as in relative 
income poverty are generally unable to reach an acceptable standard of 
living as defined by members of the public. 
Further information and publications available at: 
www.minimumincomestandard.org
This report considers the disposable incomes of different types of household, 
on different wages and working different numbers of hours, relative to MIS. 
First, it looks at the extent to which people can reach this standard under 
the UC system. It then looks at the effect of changes to this, alongside other 
changes taking place in the tax and benefit system. The purpose of these 
comparisons is to consider how the changing structure and level of support 
affects both incentives and income adequacy, as measured by MIS.
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 2 THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN EARNINGS 
AND INCOME 
ADEQUACY UNDER 
UNIVERSAL CREDIT 
The graphs on the following pages look at the 
relationship between a family’s working hours, 
their wages, their disposable income, including UC, 
and what they need for a minimum acceptable 
living standard according to MIS. They thus show 
the incentive to work longer hours at various 
wage levels and the extent to which additional 
rewards from doing so enable households to meet 
minimum needs. The calculations are based on the 
entitlements of a range of family types according 
to various scenarios; the assumptions used are 
described in the Appendix. 
Working-age adults without children
The first pair of graphs (Figure 1) represents the case of households without 
children, either single people or couples, in each case living with no other 
people.
In both cases, rewards from work are substantial under UC. A single 
person with no work has less than half of what they need – just under 40 
per cent of the MIS requirements after rent and council tax (and this is 
even lower in cases, not shown here, where not all rent is covered through 
UC, either because a social tenant is penalised for under-occupying social 
housing or because a private tenant pays rent above eligible levels). 
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A single person can earn £25 a week without losing UC. This significantly 
improves their disposable income, bringing it to about 50 per cent of MIS, 
rather than below 40 per cent if they do not work. However, after this 
point UC is reduced by 65 per cent of additional wages (net of tax). This 
has different effects according to wage rates (Figure 1a). On the Minimum 
Wage, it means an additional working hour produces £2 or less in disposable 
income, and makes it impossible to reach the minimum even when working 
full time. Someone earning £7.95 an hour on the other hand (a ‘typical’ 
low-paid worker, since someone in the middle of the lower half of the wage 
distribution earns this amount) can just reach the minimum working full 
time. A single person on the median wage is about 50 per cent above the 
minimum. Work incentives are greater for people on relatively higher wages 
because they are not entitled to UC if they work more than a few hours a 
week, so the disincentive of it being reduced as earnings rise does not apply. 
Figure 1: Disposable income compared to Minimum Income Standard under 
Universal Credit, 2013 – working-age adults without children
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Figure 1b shows the situation for a couple where one person is already 
working full time, according to the working hours of the second partner. 
This shows that, even on the Minimum Wage, a couple without children 
can get to an adequate income by both working full time. If both earn the 
median wage, equivalent to about £22,000 a year each, they can get to 
twice the minimum. However, the graph shows a less encouraging picture for 
a second earner working part time, where both partners are on low wages 
(the diagrams assume the same wage for both partners). Couples on the 
Minimum Wage with such working patterns will still be dependent on UC, 
and this will be withdrawn at a rate of 65 per cent, rather than the 41 per 
cent withdrawal rate for tax credits (see discussion on couples with children 
below). This means that a second earner working two days a week on the 
Minimum Wage would earn about £100, but keep only £35 rather than £59 
today, a significant reduction in work incentives.
Lone parent families
Figure 2 shows the disposable income, after rent and childcare costs, of lone 
parent families with one or two young children of various ages. When such 
families do not work, UC provides around 60 per cent of minimum needs, 
which is a higher proportion than for those without children, but it still falls 
far short of what is required for an acceptable living standard. 
An important feature of UC is that, by allowing lone parents to keep 
these benefits while earning up to about £60 a week, it allows part of this 
shortfall to be covered by those performing ‘mini-jobs’ of up to about ten 
hours a week. However, once these earnings are reached, benefits fall off 
sharply, while working more hours imposes extra childcare costs. This is why 
the lines in Figure 2 show ‘plateau’ effects after the first few hours of work. 
In particular, those on a Minimum Wage retain so little of any additional 
income earned – especially once they are paying tax – that working full 
time produces no additional disposable income after childcare costs when 
compared to part time for families with one child, and significantly less for 
those with two children, who face greater childcare costs for each extra 
hour they work.
Figure 2 shows that:
• a lone parent on a low wage and with childcare costs cannot generally 
get above about 80 per cent of the income required for a minimum 
acceptable living standard; 
• even on the median wage of £11.26 an hour, lone parents with young 
children can fi nd it hard to make ends meet. With one child, they can 
almost do so if they work full time. With two children requiring childcare 
they still fall over 10 per cent short.
UC contributes to these patterns by having a relatively generous ‘disregard’ 
but a relatively steep ‘withdrawal rate’. It helps lone parents to reach a higher 
living standard than single people, but rapidly withdraws this support at well 
below the earnings that produce an acceptable standard of living. So while 
there is a relatively more generous floor put on the income of lone parents 
than of single people, there is also a more severe income ceiling for those on 
low to medium wages. Unless lone parents have above average wages, they 
cannot raise their living standards above the minimum. 
Importantly, the high withdrawal rate of UC is compounded by the high 
cost of childcare, which reduces the benefit of working more hours. An hour 
worked on the minimum wage yields about £1.50 after additional tax and 
On the Minimum 
Wage, a couple without 
children can get to an 
adequate income by 
both working full time.
While there is a 
relatively more 
generous floor put on 
the income of lone 
parents than of single 
people, there is also a 
more severe income 
ceiling.
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reduced UC, and an hour of childcare for one child costs about £1 net of 
UC support for childcare, leaving only 50p extra disposable income for each 
additional hour worked. The childcare cost for a second child turns even this 
small gain into a net loss. (Note: these calculations are on the present rates 
of reimbursement for childcare costs; plans to increase them in 2016 are 
looked at later in this report.)
Figure 2: Disposable income compared to Minimum Income Standard under 
Universal Credit, 2013 – lone parents
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b) Lone parent with 2 children, primary and preschool age
Couples with children
Figure 3 considers two examples of couples with two children. In each case it 
assumes that one partner works full time on the same wage, and shows the 
net income the family ends up with according to the hours worked by the 
second partner, ranging from none to full-time work. 
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Figure 3: Disposable income compared to Minimum Income Standard under 
Universal Credit, 2013 – couples with children
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b) Couple with two children, secondary age
The first graph shows that, as with lone parents working, second earners in 
such families see a ‘plateau’ effect on their income as they move from part-
time to full-time work. The cost of additional childcare for two children can 
be approximately the same as the additional take-home income of someone 
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on low pay. As mentioned above, one child requiring additional childcare 
takes about £1 out of the £1.50 yielded by a taxpayer on UC earning 
the Minimum Wage; a second child, even paying half price (for a family 
discount) at the childminder’s will cost the family the remaining 50p, leaving 
no overall gain.
The main difference between this case and a lone parent with two 
children is that the ‘plateau’ on any given wage is somewhat higher – so two 
people working full time can provide more adequately for the family than a 
lone parent. Nevertheless, a typical low-paid couple, even working full time 
at significantly above the Minimum Wage, can still fall short. 
Because of the importance of childcare costs to these results, the case 
of a family with secondary-school-age children requiring no childcare is 
markedly different, as shown in the lower part of Figure 3. Such a family 
requires about £50 a week more than a younger family (after childcare 
costs), due to additional costs of items such as clothing, food and social 
participation. This means that with just one partner working on a low wage 
of £7.95 an hour, they are worse off relative to need, falling about £140 a 
week short of meeting an MIS budget compared to £90 for a family with 
a primary and preschool child. However, a second earner is better able to 
reduce this shortfall where there are no associated childcare costs. For a 
family on median wages, additional rewards for the second earner working 
more than about two days a week are especially strong, because no UC is 
payable for such a family, so additional earnings are retained, net only of 
income tax and National Insurance contributions. 
These results thus show that under UC, there will be far stronger 
incentives for second earners to go out to work as their children get older, 
and that some of those with younger children will have no choice but to put 
up with low living standards. It should be emphasised that this contrast arises 
more through the extremely strong work disincentive created by childcare 
for people on UC, rather than through particularly good work incentives for 
those without childcare costs. The system still has a 76 per cent ‘withdrawal 
rate’ for the latter if they are on UC and paying tax.
Comparison of full-time incomes across household types
The above analysis shows considerable variations in the ability of different 
kinds of household to earn adequate incomes. Figure 4 looks across 
households at how much income, relative to MIS, is yielded by working on 
the Minimum Wage and on a median wage.
At the Minimum Wage, across most household types there is a similar 
picture. With the exception of a couple without children, full-time work 
on this wage leaves households about 20 per cent short of an adequate 
standard of living. This similarity shows that UC, like the tax credit system 
before it, is reasonably efficient at equalising living standards for households 
of different composition on the very lowest wages. 
In contrast, on a median wage, living standards vary greatly by household 
type. Households without children are able to get well above the minimum, 
and couples with children can generally at least reach the minimum if both 
partners work full time on a median wage. Households on such incomes do 
not require any UC. Once earnings rise above the level at which UC runs out, 
over two thirds of additional pay is available as disposable income (post tax 
and National Insurance contributions). For lone parents, on the other hand, 
the high level of dependence on UC for living and childcare costs means 
that even on a median wage there is usually some UC entitlement. As a 
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Figure 4: Disposable income relative to MIS (%), all adults working full time
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consequence, only a quarter of additional earnings are retained by the family, 
since reductions in UC offset pay increases. This explains why lone parents 
are typically only about 15–20 per cent better off on £11.26 an hour (the 
median) than on £6.18 an hour (the minimum), and still struggle to reach a 
minimum acceptable standard of living.
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 3 PAST AND FUTURE 
CHANGES IN INCOME 
ADEQUACY
UC marks a major change in the structure of 
support to low-income households. Understanding 
its impact on income adequacy is complicated by 
the fact that it is being introduced at a time when 
several other changes are being made to the 
benefi ts and tax system. While the switch to UC puts 
slightly more money overall into income transfers 
to households, as do increases in the personal tax 
allowance, cuts in the real level of various benefi ts 
and tax credits, taking place both before and during 
the switch to UC, have the reverse eff ect.
The following analysis starts by comparing incomes relative to MIS in 2013 
under the old system and with UC, as they start to run in parallel. Secondly, 
it compares the UC regime to the present regime as it would have been 
without the various changes to entitlements that have taken place since 
2010, affecting families with children. Thirdly, it looks at the impact of 
various further announced changes that will come in as the switch to UC 
proceeds. Finally, it brings these changes together, showing a story of 
progression between 2010 under the old system to 2015 under the new 
system. All of these changes are reported in 2013 terms – translating 
previous and future levels of entitlement into today’s values.  
Switching from benefits and tax credits to UC in 2013 
Figure 5 compares the tax credit and benefit system to the UC system for 
three household types, in terms of the consequences of working various 
hours on a low wage (£7.95 an hour) for income adequacy. The patterns for 
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Figure 5: Disposable income compared to Minimum Income Standard under 
old system and under Universal Credit, 2013*
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Lone parents working 
fewer than 16 hours a 
week gain the most.
these three household types vary considerably, but two commonalities can 
be noted:
• In no case does UC always represent either an improvement or a 
deterioration in income adequacy across the range of working hours. 
• Where there are benefi ts from the switchover, they occur for people 
working relatively few hours, helping them to become better off  than 
if they were not working, but still leaving them well below an adequate 
income as measured by MIS.
 More specifically, looking at each part of Figure 5 in turn:
• For a single person working fewer than 30 hours a week, and therefore 
not entitled to tax credits, UC provides more generous support because, 
unlike Income Support, it is not withdrawn pound for pound above a small 
disregard. However, since single people working full time on this wage are 
not supported under either system, the change makes no difference to 
living standards for full-timers without children. 
• Lone parents working fewer than 16 hours a week gain the most. They 
are entitled neither to general tax credits nor to help with childcare in the 
present system, and so would be worse off in a mini-job if they require 
childcare than if they were not working at all. However, working two days 
a week they can be better off under the old system, and working more 
than that there is not much difference. 
• A couple with a single earner may be slightly better off under UC, but a 
second person’s earnings bring in more, net, under the old system. This 
is because of the different ways in which income tax interacts with tax 
credits and with UC. For someone below the tax and National Insurance 
threshold, UC is withdrawn at a rate of 65 per cent of additional earnings, 
rather than the 41 per cent in the case of tax credits. (For people paying 
tax, the combined withdrawal rate is similar under the two systems: 73 
per cent with tax credits and 76 per cent with UC, but UC produces this 
with a high taper on post-tax income rather than a lower taper on pre-
tax income, as under tax credits). 
• Recent gains from raising the tax allowance will largely be lost under UC, 
since the move to a post-tax taper will claw back the gains from tax cuts 
(Hirsch, 2013). As a consequence of recent increases in the allowance, 
a couple working full time on £7.95 an hour has come close to meeting 
the minimum under the old system, and the predicted fall in their income 
under UC has increased.
UC and recent changes in entitlements
The past three years have seen important changes in tax and benefit 
entitlements, separate from the switch to UC. This means that even though 
some families may gain on the switchover, they may not be better off than 
they would have been without the cuts. 
The main changes to affect the comparisons being made here apply to 
families with children. In particular, the tax credit system has been adjusted in 
ways that make it harder for them to earn enough to reach MIS. In 2011, the 
‘taper rate’ at which tax credits are withdrawn as income rises was increased. 
In the same year, the maximum childcare tax credit level was reduced from 
80 to 70 per cent of childcare costs. As set out in Davis et al. (2012), these 
changes added £5,000 to the amount a couple with two children had to earn 
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between them to reach MIS. The effect of a freezing of Child Benefit and of 
a small real increase in Child Tax Credit almost exactly cancelled each other 
out, while higher tax allowances had a smaller, benign effect on earnings 
requirements. Cuts in council tax support had a small negative effect.
Figure 6: Disposable income compared to Minimum Income Standard in 
2013 with and without recent changes in entitlements*
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* Earning £7.95 an hour
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. 
Figure 6 reflects the imagined situation that the value of tax credits, 
Child Benefit and tax allowances had been uprated by inflation since 2010, 
and that the tax credit taper, the percentage of childcare eligible for tax 
credit support and Council Tax Benefit had stayed the same. It compares the 
consequences of such an ‘unchanged’ system to the actual situation under 
the UC and tax credit systems, all in 2013.
The results for lone parents show that the new system’s advantage for 
people in mini-jobs applies regardless of recent cuts. On the other hand, for 
those working more than 16 hours, rewards for working would be greater 
under the pre-2011 tax credit system than under UC in 2013. This is also 
true, to a lesser extent, for a second earner in a couple with children. In both 
cases the net effect of changes made since 2010, even when the raising of 
tax allowances and the introduction of UC are included, has been to reduce 
the adequacy of incomes of families (with children) in full-time employment. 
In the example shown in Figure 6a, the effect leaves a lone parent, working 
full time, 17 per cent rather than 9 per cent short of MIS.
UC and future changes in entitlements
Between 2013/14 and 2015/16, benefits and the UC will be rising by a 
standard one per cent annually, and therefore, given inflation, will become 
less adequate for families trying to make ends meet. Figure 7a shows, 
through the example of a lone parent, the result of this further deterioration 
in support levels: slightly lower net incomes across the board. While these 
changes in income adequacy are clearly small, the cumulative effect of 
increasing UC more slowly than living costs in future years will add up. 
At the same time, other changes in the benefit system can also make a 
significant difference. Some families could lose out substantially through cuts 
in housing support. Up until recently, these changes have mainly affected 
private tenants, but from 2013 the penalty for under-occupying social 
housing (the so-called ‘Bedroom Tax’) means that even social tenants cannot 
count on getting their rent fully covered. The effect on social tenants with a 
spare bedroom is shown as the lower line in Figure 7b. 
Figure 7b also considers the effect of a measure that the Government 
is consulting on, for introduction from 2016. This would pay an 85 per cent 
childcare tax credit to families who are above the income tax threshold. 
This creates a jump in support at the point at which the family reaches 
such a threshold, and better opportunities to improve income by working 
longer hours above that level. It would allow a lone parent working full time 
on a low wage to get much closer than at present to reaching a minimum 
acceptable standard of living. However, it is also important to note that six 
in ten working parents under the UC system do not earn enough to pay tax 
(Alekson et al., 2013), and so their families will not benefit from this increase 
(which is contingent on a lone parent, or both members of a couple, paying 
tax). The change would thus allow some families earning almost enough to 
reach MIS to get closer to or cross the threshold; however, those with much 
lower earnings, and where at least one person is working part time and on 
less than £10,000 a year, will become no better off.
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Figure 7: Effect of sub-inflation uprating of Universal Credit, 2013–15 – 
lone parent with one child*
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Overall changes 2010–2015
Figure 8 shows, again through the example of a lone parent, how various 
changes described above have affected disposable incomes of those working 
different hours. It shows the adequacy of incomes on low earnings in 2013, 
under different policy scenarios from the past, present and future. 
For those working too few hours to be eligible for tax credits, the switch 
to the UC has been the most important factor, making it possible in principle 
to boost income above basic out-of-work benefit levels. For those working 
16 hours or more, the picture is rather different. While in some cases the 
switch to UC has raised disposable income slightly, this was preceded by a 
deterioration from 2010 to 2013, and will be followed by further losses. On 
the other hand, if the Government proceeds with its plan to give taxpayers 
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Figure 8: Changes in disposable income relative to Minimum Income 
Standard, lone parent with one child, 2013
30%
20%
10%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0%
Old system 2010 uprated
Old system actual
UC actual
UC + future cuts
UC future + 85% childcare for taxpayers 
%
 o
f M
IS
15 hours 25 hours Full time (37.5 hours)
a maximum of 85 per cent of childcare costs through UC, the deterioration 
since 2010 will be largely reversed, for those in a position to benefit. This 
measure is especially important for helping low-paid families get closer to a 
minimum acceptable standard of living by working longer hours. It restores 
a situation that can make work pay in these circumstances for low-wage 
workers requiring childcare – although as mentioned above, it would not 
help families with at least one part-time earner who does not reach the 
tax threshold. 
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 4 CONCLUSION
This report has shown that UC can provide some 
households on low earnings with improved disposable 
incomes compared with the current system, 
particularly if they work only a few hours. However, 
for others, especially those working full time, it can 
involve a cut in disposable income. This confi rms the 
offi  cial impact assessment stating that there will be 
similar numbers of winners and losers (3.1 million 
will be better off  and 2.8 million worse off  – DWP, 
2012). 
However, the present report goes beyond narrow ‘better or worse off’ 
calculations at the point of introduction of UC. It considers the net effect 
of the introduction of UC and other recent and projected changes in 
entitlements. In many cases, reductions in these entitlements have been 
more significant to families than gains or losses through the restructuring 
involved in the introduction of UC itself. The same is true for the prospective 
increase in support for childcare. 
The report also has important findings on work incentives, a central 
consideration of government policy. In general, UC helps strengthen 
the incentive to do a bit of work, but in many cases weakens rewards for 
additional work. 
This is particularly important because, for many families, UC does not 
provide a reliable route to an adequate income, as measured by MIS. Lone 
parents only able to access jobs with modest wages are helped to raise 
their incomes to around three quarters the level of a minimum standard by 
working about ten hours a week. However, if they work longer, the falling 
value of UC combines with the growing childcare bill to prevent them 
from getting much closer to the minimum. For a couple with two children, 
it can be more worthwhile for both parents to work full time, but with 
young children it can still be hard to exceed the minimum on a low wage. 
A particular disadvantage for second earners in such families is that if they 
work part time and do not pay income tax, the family’s UC is reduced to 
reflect additional earnings at a far faster rate than under tax credits. 
22Does Universal Credit enable households to reach a minimum income standard?
Thus, UC allows people to become better off by working a few hours 
rather than not at all, which was not always true under the previous system. 
However, this improvement does not generally get them to a minimum 
acceptable income level. In many respects it has become harder to progress 
further to reach this minimum. Importantly, this latter effect has been 
produced not just by the switch to UC but also by other changes such as 
the reduction in support for childcare, combined with the growing cost of 
childcare itself. Conversely, the planned change to a more generous form 
of childcare support could have a greater impact on families’ ability to make 
ends meet than the switch to UC. So while UC does represent a historic 
structural change to the way benefits and in-work credits are paid, its effect 
on working households’ economic well-being should not be exaggerated.
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 APPENDIX: 
SCENARIOS AND 
ASSUMPTIONS
The calculations made in this report are all based on ‘modelled families’: they 
look at the financial situation, in terms of disposable income, of families with 
particular earnings and costs, provided they claimed everything to which 
they were entitled. It is important to acknowledge that this approach shows 
changes in what is possible under different systems, rather than mapping 
changes in actual incomes. It does not, for example, take account of changes 
in take-up: if the introduction of a simpler welfare system succeeds in 
improving take-up of entitlements, many families could become better off 
to a greater extent than modelled through these theoretical calculations. 
Similarly, it does not show changes in actual family outcomes deriving from 
changes in behaviour. It is possible that the more favourable situation for 
very part-time working will cause some families to work a few hours rather 
than no hours, while others may restrict their hours because of higher 
withdrawal rates; in these cases they could become better or worse off partly 
as a result of these behaviours.
The assumptions about childcare usage and costs and about housing 
costs are based on the MIS research. This assumes as a starting point that 
families live in social housing and that they require paid childcare at average 
central England childminder rates for each child under the age of 11 while 
they are working, except for the period when a child is at school or receives 
free early years childcare provision.
In mapping the effect of the new system, it was assumed that council tax 
support is paid at a rate of 91.5 per cent for people with no earnings, and 
tapered at 20 per cent on all earned income. This is in line with the most 
common model adopted by councils (Pennycook and Hurrell, 2013).
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